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CONSTRUCTING COMPETITION LAW IN 
CHINA: THE POTENTIAL VALUE OF EUROPEAN 
AND U.S. EXPERIENCE 
DAVID J. GERBER* 
China will develop its own competition law on its own terms and on 
the basis of its own institutions, traditions, and goals, as it has in other 
recent contexts.1 It is unlikely to accept any foreign model of competition 
law as its own. In making choices about what kind of competition law to 
create, however, Chinese decision makers are likely to make at least some 
use of concepts and institutions that have been developed elsewhere. In 
this brief Essay, I examine several of the key decisions to be made in 
constructing a competition law for China and consider ways in which 
foreign experience may be of value to Chinese decision-makers.  
I do not here suggest to Chinese decision-makers what they should do. 
The role I envision is much more modest. It is to comment on the two 
systems from which the Chinese are most likely to borrow concepts and 
institutions—that is, European and U.S. competition law—and to suggest 
ways in which information about them may be useful in the construction 
of a competition law regime for China. In particular, I review European 
and U.S. experiences in constructing and developing the goals and 
institutions of competition law in light of the potential relevance of those 
experiences for China’s decisions about competition law. 
I. CONSTRUCTING COMPETITION LAW: THE ROLE OF BORROWING 
Borrowing language and institutions from foreign sources has obvious 
attractions for Chinese decision makers.2 It is easier and more efficient 
than creating entirely new ones. Borrowed language has already been 
 
 
 * This Essay is based on a presentation I gave at a conference entitled “Competition Law and 
Economic Development” held in September, 2002, in Beijing, China. The conference, hosted by the 
Chinese Academy of Social Science, was addressed primarily to Chinese administrators, academics, 
and political leaders. For purposes of publication, I have added footnotes and made a few minor 
textual changes. The text as presented at the conference was translated into Chinese and published by 
the Chinese Academy of Social Science.  
 1. For a discussion of recent Chinese reform projects in relation to international developments, 
see generally PITMAN B. POTTER, THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: GLOBALIZATION AND LOCAL LEGAL 
CULTURE (2001). 
 2. For discussion of the borrowing and adaptation of foreign legal elements in recent Chinese 
experience, see Pitman B. Potter, Globalization and Economic Regulation in China: Selective 
Adaptation of Globalized Norms and Practices, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 119 (2003). 
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given meaning by institutions in one system, and this is likely to increase 
the level of predictability in interpreting such language in the new system. 
Similarly, institutions that already exist have a record that can be 
examined and evaluated before putting them into operation in a new 
system. The experiences provide a basis for evaluating how language and 
institutions can be expected to function in the new system. In addition, the 
use of language and institutions that are widely known internationally can 
increase their perceived legitimacy and acceptance among lawyers, 
government officials, and businesses outside China.3 
However, effective borrowing of language and institutions is difficult, 
because it extracts them from the context in which they have been used.4 It 
is akin to using tools without knowing what they were designed for or 
exactly how they have been used in the past. In order to assess the value 
and utility of these legal tools and to use them effectively, therefore, it is 
important to “recontextualize” them by examining how and why they were 
created, how they have developed, what their relationship is to other 
elements of the system, and what consequences they have produced. This 
kind of knowledge is particularly important when a competition law 
system is being constructed. Once the basic goals are established and the 
basic institutions are created, such things will not be easily changed. 
In this Essay, I focus on two elements of this construction process—the 
establishment of goals for the system and the creation of institutions. 
These two elements are central to the operation of a competition law 
system, and thus borrowing them takes on special value. For both 
European and U.S. legal systems, I examine how the central goals and 
basic institutions were established and how they have developed. I then 
comment on the potential value of this information for Chinese decision 
makers. 
II. U.S. ANTITRUST LAW EXPERIENCE: GOALS AND METHODS 
A. Constructing the U.S. System 
U.S. antitrust law was created in 1890 in response to populist political 
pressure. Several large “trusts” (integrated groups of companies) were 
perceived to be using their economic power to force their competitors out 
 
 
 3. This issue has been an important impetus for the development of competition law in China, 
particularly since China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001. 
 4. For an analysis of Chinese experience in the related area of corporation law that is sensitive 
to these issues, see Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law 
and Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599 (2000). 
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of business, gain unfair terms from their suppliers, and raise prices to 
consumers. This led to widespread popular resentment in some parts of the 
country and demands for constraints on the anticompetitive activities of 
big business.5 
In response to these demands, Congress enacted a simple statute, the 
Sherman Act, that made “restraint of trade” and “monopolization” 
violations of federal law.6 Both concepts were already part of the common 
law tradition that originated in England and was the basis of the United 
States legal system.7 These concepts, however, had been seldom applied in 
the nineteenth century either in the United States or England. The 
Sherman Act merely incorporated the concepts into federal law and 
attached penalties for their violation. It contained extremely general 
language and failed to provide guidance as to the goals to be used in 
interpreting it. In addition, the Sherman Act did not create new 
institutions, procedures, or methods to apply the law. The Statute provided 
for government and private lawsuits to enforce it. Private lawsuits were 
encouraged by providing treble damage awards for successful plaintiffs. 
These initial decisions set the course for the development of antitrust 
law in the United States. Given that the language of the statute was very 
general and that there was virtually no guidance in the Statute about how it 
should be interpreted, judges had to articulate goals in specific cases. 
Moreover, because no new institutions were created, the operation of the 
antitrust system would have to depend on general institutions and 
procedures of the legal system. 
B. Evolution of the System 
The evolution of goals and institutions in the United States provides 
potential experience that can be of general value to Chinese decision-
makers. Yet, the vast difference between the context of development in the 
United States and the current situation in China means that the U.S. 
experience is rarely specifically applicable to Chinese decisions. Although 
 
 
 5. For leading discussions of the development of U.S. antitrust laws, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP 
& GEOFFERY HOSKING, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937 (1991); WILLIAM LETWIN, 
LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 
(1981); RUDOLPH PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA 1888-1992 (1996); Eleanor M. Fox & 
Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust—Retrospective and Prospective: Where are we coming from? Where 
are we going? 62 N.Y.U.L . REV. 936 (1987); William Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A 
Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (2000).  
 6. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2001). 
 7. See LETWIN, supra note 5, at 18-52. 
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I only refer here to the legal context, there are obviously extensive 
political, demographic, and social differences as well. 
1. Articulating Competition Law Goals 
Throughout the development of the U.S. system, the federal courts 
have articulated the goals of the system. This process has produced a 
diverse body of stated goals that refers to economic, social, and political 
values. At various times, for example, concerns for fairness (particularly 
for small and medium-sized firms), equality of opportunity, and economic 
liberty have been deposited in this substrate.8 The stated goals of the 
system have changed over time, but until recently they represented a 
relatively broad amalgam to which judges could refer in order to justify 
their antitrust decisions.9 
In recent years, however, the goals of U.S. antitrust law have changed 
radically, as have the influences on the goal articulation process. Since the 
late 1970s, scholars identified with the “law-and-economics” movement 
have superimposed a different conception of antitrust goals on the existing 
caselaw background.10 Such scholars have argued that the goals of 
antitrust should be defined much more narrowly than they have 
traditionally been defined and that they should be determined solely by 
reference to economic theory.11 Their theories regarding goals quickly 
won acceptance during the 1980s, thus fundamentally reorienting 
competition law. This law-and-economics “revolution” is central to our 
analysis. As with most victories, it is partial and not always what it seems, 
but it has nonetheless been an impressive “victory.” 
2. Methods and Institutions 
The basic institutional structure of U.S. competition law has not been 
significantly altered since its inception. An administrative agency, the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), was added to the structure in 1914, but 
in most basic institutional respects, the system remains little changed. The 
 
 
 8. For classic discussions of these issues, see Eleanor Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A 
New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140 (1981); Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of 
Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979).  
 9. See DAVID J. GERBER, Competition, in OXFORD BOOK OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (forthcoming 
2003). 
 10. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998). 
 11. For the now-classic statement of this position, see generally ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST 
PARADOX (1978). 
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courts are still the prime decision-makers for the most part, they still use 
general civil procedures rather than special competition-law-related 
procedures; and the Justice Department is still the most important 
enforcement office. 
The actual operations of the system have, however, changed 
fundamentally. Many of the most significant changes in the operation of 
the system have resulted not from a consideration of the needs of the 
antitrust law system, but from changes in the general procedures of the 
courts. The fact that U.S. antitrust law relies heavily on the regular courts 
for its implementation and enforcement means that changes in the 
procedures of those courts change the way the antitrust system operates. 
Perhaps the most important of these procedural changes has been the 
expansion of procedural discovery rights since the 1940s. This 
development has led to a procedural environment in which each party has 
extensive rights to demand information from the other party and to some 
extent from third parties. In principle, a party is permitted to demand any 
information that can reasonably be expected to lead to evidence that is 
admissible in court. This contrasts sharply with the procedures in most 
other systems, where typically information can be demanded only by a 
court and only where there is a reasonable expectation that the information 
itself will be admissible as evidence.12 
This difference in standards is often of great significance for antitrust 
law, because U.S. procedure often brings extensive amounts of 
information to the decisional process that would not be available 
elsewhere. This phenomenon affects the way judges evaluate factual 
allegations and creates legal doctrines that are highly nuanced and fact-
specific. It also tends to create far more complex and expensive 
competition-law litigation than exists elsewhere. 
3. Relevance for China 
There are two basic ways of looking at the possible relevance of this 
experience for China today. One is to see U.S. development as an 
evolutionary process that has produced “the best” approach. This 
perspective is commonly assumed in discussions of antitrust by U.S. 
experts.13 Here the argument is that the United States has experimented 
 
 
 12. For discussion from a comparative perspective, see generally David J. Gerber, 
Extraterritorial Discovery and the Conflict of Procedural Systems: Germany and the United States, 34 
AM. J. COMP. L. 745 (1986). 
 13. For a sophisticated treatment of U.S. legal “models” and attitudes regarding them in the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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with competition law longer than have other systems, that “trial and error” 
experience has led to the rejection of approaches that have been shown to 
be ineffective, and that this process has generated a superior system that 
should be copied by others. In this view, the current U.S. version of law-
and-economics doctrine should guide China’s goals, and China should 
create an institutional system that centers on judges and economists. This 
perspective is universalist, implying that the U.S. experience is relevant to 
China in the same sense that it is relevant to all other countries. However, 
this universalist perspective disregards differences in circumstances and 
political objectives.  
From this universalist perspective, U.S. experience in competition law 
can be of much value. U.S. courts have looked at complex problems from 
many angles, and thus the study of U.S. cases and doctrines can provide 
much insight into issues of legal and conceptual development. This body 
of case law can be of value in constructing the system, but it will become 
particularly important as Chinese courts and administrators are forced to 
apply concepts and doctrines to specific problems. Recent U.S. law-and-
economics scholarship also provides sophisticated analysis of the potential 
economic effects of particular agreements and conduct, and this can also 
be of value in developing China’s competition law. The so-called “rational 
actor” assumptions that underlie its application may, however, be of less 
value in some Chinese contexts than they are seen to be in the U.S. 
context. 
A second view examines whether the U.S. experience is specifically 
relevant to the Chinese situation. Does US experience in setting goals and 
creating and maintaining institutions relate specifically to the situation in 
China? Here the answer seems to be that the U.S. experience has limited 
relevance. 
The circumstances surrounding the creation of the U.S. system have 
little in common with China’s situation today. First, legislatively-enacted 
competition law did not exist anywhere at the time the U.S. system was 
established.14 There were no foreign models or experience to which 
Congress could look in fashioning a competition law system. Congress did 
not carry out serious comparative analysis and investigation because there 
 
 
United States and in post-communist countries, see generally Jacques de Lisle, Lex Americana?: 
United States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist 
World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 179 (1999). 
 14. A Canadian statute had been enacted the prior year, but it was to play a decidedly secondary 
role in the subsequent story of competition law development. See Act for the Prevention and 
Suppression of Combinations Formed in Restraint of Trade, S.C. 1889, ch. 41 (Can.). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss2/7
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was nothing to investigate. In contrast, Chinese decision-makers today 
have much foreign experience to examine in making their decisions. They 
also have time to consider this experience carefully. Second, concepts 
relating to the protection of competition were already available in the 
United States. Thus, Congress was able to simply “federalize” existing 
common law concepts. There are no similar general principles in current 
Chinese law. Third, the process of competition was itself highly valued in 
the United States, and the idea of individual economic opportunity was 
firmly rooted in U.S. society. In China, in contrast, the process of 
competition and associated values appear to be less well embedded. 
Finally, in the United States the independence of judges as well as their 
role in law-making were already well established. This enabled those 
developing the system to rely on judges to play certain roles that they 
cannot play where they are neither independent nor perceived to be 
independent. This independence of the judiciary is not yet fully established 
in China, although there have been and still are efforts to develop it.15  
The evolution of the U.S. system also provides relatively little that is 
specifically relevant to the Chinese situation. Its reliance on judges to 
articulate the goals of the system is probably not politically acceptable in 
China, in part because the status, experience, and role of judges in China 
provides little basis for expecting them to perform that function. 
Moreover, the narrow competition law goal of pursuing economic 
efficiency does not correspond to the political expectations supporting the 
drive for competition law in China. The goals posited for competition law 
in China include conceptions of “fairness” that are not considered 
appropriate in current U.S. antitrust thinking.16 Similarly, institutional 
reliance on the regular courts and on general procedures for the application 
and enforcement of competition law in the United States appears 
inconsistent with the role that courts play in China and with the procedures 
they follow.  
 
 
 15. See, e.g., THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA (Karen Turner et al. eds., 1999). 
 16. For discussion of contemporary Chinese thinking about competition law and prospects for 
the enactment of a competition law statute, see Wang Xiaoye, The Prospect of Anti-Monopoly 
Legislation in China, 1 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 201 (2002). 
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III. THE EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW EXPERIENCE: GOALS AND 
METHODS 
The European experience in constructing the goals and tools of 
competition law presents a picture that is both different from U.S. 
experience and potentially more relevant to the construction of 
competition law in China.17 In it, the goals and methods of competition 
law have evolved gradually over a century, as national and regional 
(European Union-E.U.) decision-makers have sought to construct and 
protect market economies and develop and protect democratic political 
systems.  
A. Evolution of a European Competition Law Model  
The idea of using law to protect the competitive process emerged in 
Europe in the 1890s at approximately the same time that the United States 
enacted its first antitrust statute. In Austria, a group of scholars and 
administrators articulated the idea of using law to encourage economic 
growth and competitiveness, reduce antagonisms between workers and 
owners and among regional ethnic groups. It would also give the 
administrative elite a voice in economic development without giving them 
excessive opportunities to interfere with business decision-making.18 The 
proposed legislation was discussed and almost enacted, but political 
turmoil within the empire in 1897 prevented its enactment. 
Before the First World War, politicians in Germany, particularly those 
representing smaller businesses, picked up and widely promoted these 
ideas. However, the German Kaiser, not willing to allow interference with 
his plans for industrial and military development, prevented enactment of 
such legislation. After the war and the creation of a German republic, 
supporters of the idea succeeded in enacting an early form of competition 
 
 
 17. I will here refer to Europe as one system and to the European experience as one experience. 
In a technical sense, this has not been true until very recently, but, as I have shown elsewhere, 
European competition experiences have been interrelated and interwoven throughout the development 
of each individual system. 
 For a discussion of this development and the interweaving of national and regional (European 
Union) competition law systems, see DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH 
CENTURY EUROPE: PROTECTING PROMETHEUS (1998) [hereinafter, GERBER, LAW AND 
COMPETITION]. A summary is contained in David J. Gerber, Europe and the Globalization of Antitrust 
Law, 14 CONN. J. INT’L LAW 15 (1999) from which I have borrowed in preparing this Essay. 
 18. I recount this development in detail in David J. Gerber, The Origins of the European 
Competition Law Tradition in Fin-de-Siècle Austria, 36 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 405 (1992). See also 
GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION, supra note 17, at 43-68.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss2/7
p315 Gerber book pages.doc  2/2/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] EUROPEAN AND U.S. EXPERIENCE 323 
 
 
 
 
law in the so-called Kartellverordnung (1923), which became a significant 
part of German economic and legal life during the Weimar period.19 The 
goals sought by the supporters of this legislation were similar to the 
Austrian goals. The principal aim of such legislation was to control the 
capacity of powerful corporations to distort the competition process and 
thereby harm both consumers and smaller competitors. Institutionally, 
administrators were entrusted with authority to take action in support of 
this goal, although in practice their authority was insufficient to pursue 
these goals effectively in most situations. The legislation also aimed to 
bolster political support for the government by demonstrating that large 
enterprises were “under the control” of the government. 
Over the course of the following decade, the issue of competition law 
was widely discussed in Europe, and additional statutes similar to the 
German legislation were enacted in several smaller European states.20 In 
Norway, Social democratic leaders developed and promoted competition 
law as a means of achieving economic growth as well as protecting 
workers, both as employees and as consumers. 
By late in the decade there was widespread agreement in Europe about 
both the need for competition law and what its basic features should be. 
Neutral and expert bureaucrats would develop and enforce general 
principles designed to prevent economic actors with significant economic 
power from using that power to harm the economic process. I refer to this 
as an “administrative control model” of competition law, and its basic 
features remain central to competition law in Europe.  
After the end of the Second World War, many European governments 
turned to competition law as a means of encouraging economic revival, 
reducing class antagonisms, undergirding recently re-acquired and still 
fragile freedoms, and achieving political acceptance of postwar 
hardships.21 Virtually all of these competition law systems were based on 
the thought and experience of the interwar period. In most of these 
systems, however, competition law was embedded in economic regulatory 
frameworks that impeded its effectiveness and it was seldom supported by 
significant economic, political, or intellectual resources. As a result, these 
systems remained a rather marginal component of general economic 
policy, and some have only gradually developed beyond that point.  
In postwar Germany, competition law took a different turn—one that 
played a key role in the process of European integration and had far-
 
 
 19. See GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION, supra note 17, at 69-114. 
 20. See id. at 153-62. 
 21. See id. at 165-231. 
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reaching consequences for the course of postwar European history.22 
During the Nazi period, a group of neo-liberal thinkers initiated this 
change of direction. They secretly, and often at great personal risk, 
developed ideas of how Germany should be reconstituted after the defeat 
of the Nazi regime. In their “ordoliberal” vision of society, economic 
freedom and competition were the sources of prosperity and political 
freedom, and thus the law had to protect the competitive process. 
Moreover, competition law could accomplish that goal only if it operated 
primarily according to juridicial principles and procedures rather than on 
the basis of administrative discretion. 
These ideas became the basis in 1957 for the new German competition 
law (GWB—Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen), which, with 
limited modifications, is still in force in Germany.23 This legal framework 
was a key tool in the creation of an effective and socially responsible 
market economy. It was a key feature of the “social market economy,” 
and, as such, it played a key role in some of postwar Europe’s most 
impressive economic and political successes.24 
The creation of the European Economic Community in 1957 created 
additional roles for competition law and placed it at the center of postwar 
European history.25 One role included the task of eliminating obstacles to 
trade across national borders and creating the conditions for a successful 
and attractive “European” market. The system that was created to develop 
and enforce this competition law follows in many respects the 
administrative model just discussed. That system gives primary 
responsibility to the European Commission to develop rules and principles 
of competition law and to enforce those laws. The actions of the 
Commission are, however, subject to review and control by the European 
Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance. These courts have played 
a major role in the competition law system. However, private enforcement 
suits have been extremely rare. Although the system will change in 
important ways in 2004, the Commission and the European courts will 
continue to be at its center. These two institutions have fashioned a 
European Community competition law that is generally considered to be 
 
 
 22. See David J. Gerber, Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-liberalism, Competition 
Law and the “New Europe,” 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 25 (1994). 
 23. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschraenkungen [Law Against Restraints of Competition], 
v.27.7.1957 (BGB1.I S.1081). 
 24. For an overview of this development, see HERBERT GIERSCH ET AL., THE FADING MIRACLE: 
FOUR DECADES OF MARKET ECONOMY IN GERMANY (1992).  
 25. See GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION, supra note 17, at 334-91.  
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effective in accomplishing the dual goals of protecting competition and 
creating a regional market. 
National competition laws that had been developed according to the 
administrative control model in the first two decades after the end of the 
Second World War have been gradually “juridified.” In this process, 
juridical factors such as greater independence of decisionmakers and 
greater specificity of norms have come to play increasingly central roles in 
such systems, while the role of administrative discretion has decreased.26 
Moreover, the central place that competition law has assumed in the 
European Union has encouraged many member states to align their 
competition law regimes with that of the European Union. During the 
1980s and early 1990s, many member states either introduced competition 
laws for the first time (for example, Italy) or revised and strengthened 
existing laws to make them more like E.U. competition law (for example, 
France).  
B. Potential Relevance of European Experience for China 
The European experience in establishing the goals and institutions of 
competition law may be instructive for Chinese decision-makers as they 
consider the creation and development of competition law in China. At 
many points, Europeans have faced similar problems, and they have often 
had similar legal materials from which to fashion responses. The claim 
here is not that the European experience reveals a model of competition 
law that is “better” in some universalistic sense than others. I suggest 
rather that similarities between that experience and the situation that China 
faces may make that experience particularly valuable for Chinese 
decision-makers. It can, for example, highlight problems that Chinese 
decision-makers will face and demonstrate the potential effects of certain 
kinds of decisions. Using that experience effectively, however, requires 
careful analysis and awareness of the contexts in which decisions were 
taken and their effects produced.  
1. Goals 
The process of articulating goals is itself a central factor in the 
operation of the system. That process has been primarily judicial in the 
United States, but it has been primarily legislative in Europe. China will 
almost certainly rely primarily on the legislative process in articulating 
 
 
 26. For review of this process, see id. at 392-416. 
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competition law goals. Thus, it will establish goals in much the same way 
that they have been articulated in Europe.  
The means by which goals are articulated affects the way in which they 
are conceived and understood. European competition law systems have 
generally conceived the goals of competition law broadly, embracing not 
only concerns about economic efficiency, but also issues of fairness and 
the relationship between the competitive process and the society in which 
it is embedded. Current U.S. law, in contrast, has reduced the legitimate 
objectives of competition law to economic efficiency. Given that China is 
also likely to expect competition law to serve a variety of objectives, the 
European experience is likely to be more instructive to Chinese decision-
makers in this regard than is recent U.S. experience. Several such goals are 
likely to be important in the Chinese context.  
A central goal of competition law in Europe has been the construction 
and maintenance of markets, and China’s economic reforms have placed 
great emphasis on this objective.27 In this context, Chinese policymakers 
have also acknowledged the potential value of using law to protect the 
process of competition.28 In 1993, for example, the Chinese government 
enacted a statute entitled “An Act Against Unfair Competition.”29 It 
represented the first significant attempt to introduce competition 
protection issues into the Chinese legal systsem. The coverage of the act is 
relatively broad, including some kinds of conduct (for example, predatory 
pricing) that is considered to fall within competition law statutes in other 
systems. 
Many factors are involved in the construction of markets, but I will 
limit my comments here to two examples of this goal. One aspect of the 
process of constructing markets is the reduction of government controls on 
economic activity. In order for markets to operate effectively, economic 
actors must have the freedom to engage in competitive strategies directed 
at maximizing profits rather than meeting political objectives. Economic 
actors must be free to decide what they produce, how they produce it, how 
they sell it, and at what price. When government decision-makers prevent 
 
 
 27. China’s ultimately successful campaign to become a member of the World Trade 
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IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (Frederick M. Abbott ed., 1998). 
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 29. Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China (1993), 
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or constrain such decision making, they may inhibit the creation of 
markets or impair market operations.  
In Europe, the desire to eliminate government interference in markets 
has often provided a significant impetus for competition law development. 
Virtually all European states have had significant government control of 
economic production at some point in the last century, either as a result of 
wartime controls or as part of general economic policy, and competition 
law has often been used to facilitate the reduction of these controls. It has 
been used to create a legal framework to deter distortion of markets by 
single firms or groups of firms, particularly those that have recently 
enjoyed government support or protection. 
This goal is consistent with China’s economic reform proposals, which 
focus on gradually increasing the extent to which the economy operates on 
market principles rather than on the basis of government controls.30 This 
process has moved quickly over the last twenty years, but in many 
markets, government influence remains significant. 
Another market-construction factor involves the elimination of 
artificial borders that inhibit competition and the exchange of goods and 
services. This market-integration objective been central to the 
development of competition law in the European Union, and the planned 
eastern expansion of the European Union assures that it will remain a 
priority of E.U. competition law for many years. Although China is a 
unified polity, the reduction and elimination of artifical regional and other 
borders is generally considered to be an important factor in policy 
decisions regarding Chinese economic development. 
Related to the goal of market construction and integration is the 
objective of securing political and community support for market 
activities. I refer to this as a communitarian objective, because it stresses 
the importance of perceptions of market activity within the communities in 
which they operate. To the extent that markets are perceived as “unfair” or 
large enterprises are perceived as “exploitative” of consumers or workers, 
the public and business support necessary for the operation of markets is 
likely to diminish. 
This form of communitarian goal has often been important in the 
development of competition law in Europe. In the 1950s and 1960s, for 
example, issues of economic justice and distributive fairness were 
politically prominent. Social democratic parties either controlled or 
significantly influenced many governments, and they tended to put 
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particular emphasis on such issues. Competition law was often used to 
assure the public that large corporations would not “abuse” their economic 
power by either exploiting consumers or unfairly impeding the 
competitive opportunities of rivals and potential rivals.31 This role was 
most prominent in Germany, where competition law was a centerpiece of 
the “social market economy” that was so successful in creating economic 
well-being together with social justice during the postwar decades. This 
concept was of central importance in the German “economic miracle” of 
the 1950s and 1960s. Similar communitarian goals continue to be 
important in many European countries. 
In China’s socialist market economy, this communitarian goal is likely 
to be particularly important. According to Professor Wang Xiaoye, a 
leading competition law scholar in China: “Laws adapted to the market 
economy must regulate, restrain and safeguard the socialist market 
economy. Among these laws, the most important are those that protect fair 
and free competition.”32 The term “socialist market economy” closely 
resembles the term “social market economy” referred to above, and the 
goal is similar: to develop a market economy, but to emphasize that it 
serves societal needs. 
Another related goal of competition law has been to foster rapid 
economic growth, a prominent goal of current Chinese economic policy. 
In Europe, this was particularly important during the postwar decades, and 
it remains important today. During the postwar period in Europe, there 
were often shortages, and inflation was often an important concern.33 In 
addition, there was fear that powerful firms that had recently been 
protected from competition by national governments would be in a 
position to manipulate markets to their advantage and thus cripple 
development. Competition law was seen as a way of spurring economic 
growth and thus reducing inflation by combatting the growth-inhibiting 
effects of cartel agreements and monopolistic conduct. 
Although these features of European experience appear to render it 
particularly useful to Chinese decision makers, a word of caution is 
required in evaluating that experience. These similarities relate to what we 
can refer to as “instrumental” goals of competition law, because they are 
external to competition itself. In them, competition law achieves some 
political or economic policy “good.” It is important to recall, however, that 
 
 
 31. This was the case at time in Germany, for example. See GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION, 
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competition law in Europe has also been associated with intrinsic goals 
and values. For example, the value of economic freedom for its own sake 
has been part of the goal structure of competition law in both Germany 
and the European Union, and it has been a factor in achieving support 
from some groups.34 In this respect, there may be significant differences 
between some European experiences and China, where such intrinsic 
competition-related values may play a far more limited role.  
2. Institutions  
European experience in constructing the institutions of competition law 
may also be instructive to Chinese decision-makers. The administrative 
control model of competition law typical of European competition law 
was developed in pursuit of the goals noted above, and both the 
circumstances that recommended this institutional framework and the 
legal materials available for constructing it have close parallels with the 
situation in China. Two sets of factors may be particularly noteworthy for 
the construction of competition law in China: the institutional starting 
point for constructing the institutions and the systemic context of 
institutional development. 
a. The Starting Point 
The institutional decisions that led to the development of an 
administratively-centered competition law model in Europe were often 
made under circumstances similar to those currently facing Chinese 
decision-makers. Consequently, the starting points for the development of 
competition law institutions in Europe may be particularly instructive for 
Chinese decision-makers. The starting point for competition law 
development in Europe often included extensive economic controls 
applied by a cadre of administrators that enjoyed high social status and 
extensive political power. For those constructing competition law 
institutions (a group that often included many of these administrators), this 
phenomenon created important incentives to rely on administrative 
procedures and decision-making. The administrative elite provided 
important, perhaps necessary, political support for the development of 
competition law. Moreover, the support of this elite tended to minimize 
the extent to which competition law would threaten existing power 
positions and political relationships. 
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The administrative control model they developed also had other 
advantages. It could be enacted with relatively low cost and effort. 
Administrative officials could simply be assigned to a new office. 
Moreover, these officials did not necessarily have to do much. They could 
move very slowly when the political circumstances were unfavorable to 
rigorous enforcement of competition law principles. In general, the 
administrative control framework created opportunities to constrain some 
conduct of powerful firms and to reduce restraints on competition, but it 
allowed for gradual development of expertise and confidence in the 
competition-protection project. 
The starting point for China’s decision-makers is similar in several 
ways. First, the administrative bureaucracy has extensive influence over 
economic development and, frequently, individual firm conduct.35 To 
eliminate its regulatory role completely, and immediately create a U.S.-
style court-oriented system is likely to be politically difficult, if not 
impossible. Such a move would be made particularly difficult by the fact 
that China’s bureaucracy has power and status. It is central to the political 
system, and it would be in a position to undermine competition law 
development if that were seen to be inimical to its interests. Finally, as in 
many European contexts, those who make competition law decisions will 
need time and experience to develop their understanding of competition 
law principles, and they will have a major task of educating business 
decision makers about those principles. 
b. System Conformity  
The broader issues of system conformity also make the European 
experience relevant to China’s situation. China’s legal culture is based 
largely on the interpretation of statutory texts. These texts, together with 
administrative, political, and judicial interpretations, structure and frame 
the operation of the legal system. The same is generally true in European 
legal systems. While judicial or scholarly interpretations play far greater 
roles in some countries than they may in China, this text orientation, in 
addition to the educational, cognitive and institutional practices that 
accompany it, represent the basic operational mechanism of law. Thus, the 
materials that Europeans have had available in constructing their 
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competition law systems are similar to those available today to China’s 
decision-makers.  
Analysis related to system conformity must, of course, take into 
account the role of the Communist Party in China. This role distinguishes 
the Chinese institutional and political situation from the situation in 
Europe. It adds a layer of complexity and indeterminacy that may reduce 
the value of comparisons with European systems. Nevertheless, the basic 
similarities in institutional structures and legal materials make European 
experience highly relevant for Chinese decision-makers. 
IV. CONCLUDING COMMENTS: EVALUATING THE RELEVANCE OF U.S. 
AND E.U. EXPERIENCE FOR CHINESE DECISION-MAKERS 
This brief review of the development of goals and methods in U.S. and 
E.U. competition law suggests the potential value of this type of analysis 
for those constructing the Chinese competition law system. It provides a 
means of recontextualizing information about the two systems, placing 
concepts and institutions in the context of their use so that they can be 
more effectively evaluated and related to the needs of Chinese society.  
This Essay suggests that Chinese decision-makers can expect value 
from analyzing both E.U. and U.S. competition law experiences. In 
particular, however, it reveals the extent to which European experience 
with competition law may be particularly likely to have significant value 
for constructing and operating competition law in China. 
Chinese decision-makers will decide whether and how to use materials 
from foreign sources. They will form the goals, concepts, and institutions 
of the Chinese system by reference not only to their own perceived needs, 
but also by reference to foreign materials. This Essay suggests that careful 
analysis of E.U. and U.S. experience may be of significant value in that 
effort.  
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